As we publish this article, the M23, backed by Rwanda, is advancing towards Uvira, the second largest city in South Kivu, on the edge of the border with Burundi. After capturing Goma at the end of January and Bukavu in South Kivu on February 15, Uvira seems to be a relatively easy target for the M23-Rwandan Army coalition. Although several reasons have been presented by Rwanda to justify this military operation in the DRC, the mineral wealth of the DRC is undoubtedly a major factor driving the conflict.
Since the 1994 Tutsi genocide in Rwanda, the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been mired in a cycle of violence. At the heart of this instability lies a major issue: the exploitation of the region’s mineral resources, which have fuelled both greed and conflict.
The current crisis has its roots in the consequences of the Rwandan genocide. After Paul Kagame’s troops took power, hundreds of thousands of Hutus sought refuge in the DRC, with some forming armed groups such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), aiming to overthrow the Kigali regime. Over time, this initial threat diminished as it became less significant, but other tensions emerged in its place.
The activism of armed groups in the region has drastically weakened the security situation, leading to widespread human rights violations, including the rape of women, theft of goods, and the recruitment of children into armed groups. This situation was quickly seized upon by the Kigali regime, which used it as an excuse, claiming to protect the Congolese Tutsis, the Banyamulenge, who have lived in the region for generations. However, this supposed concern for the security of the Banyamulenge masks substantial economic interests. The soil of North Kivu is rich in valuable minerals, such as coltan and tungsten, which are crucial for the production of modern technological equipment, including smartphones.
Congolese Reactions
On February 18, 2025, the Congolese Minister of Mines, Kizito Pakabomba, accused Rwanda of siphoning off over a billion dollars from the DRC each year. In a briefing in Kinshasa, he warned that Rwanda aims to generate $2 billion in 2026 through the illegal exploitation of Congolese resources. Pakabomba pointed out that Rwanda’s occupation of Congolese territory facilitates an increase in its gold exports. He also denounced the looting of coltan since the M23 took control of the Rubaya mine, urging buyers to avoid these “blood minerals.”
The M23, supported by Rwanda, took control of the mining economy of North Kivu by seizing Rubaya, the region’s largest coltan mine, in April 2024. This armed group established a parallel administration, issuing permits and controlling the sale of coltan, a critical resource for the technology industry. Congolese Foreign Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner recently called on the UN Security Council to impose an embargo on mineral exports labelled as Rwandan due to their illegal origin.
United Nations Reactions
According to UN experts, the M23 currently controls approximately 120 tons of coltan per month, generating $800,000 in revenue, while North Kivu province loses $7 million every month due to this exploitation. This situation illustrates the correlation between war, Rwanda’s support of the M23, and the strategic control of mineral resources.
Since the M23 took Goma, Congolese minerals now pass directly through this border city with Rwanda. Before, these minerals went through Rutshuru territory in the Rugari group. Other strategic minerals, such as gold and iron, are also exploited by armed groups and transported to Rwanda before reaching international markets.
The DRC accuses Rwanda of waging an economic war while justifying its actions with ethnic claims. The greed for Kivu’s minerals by neighbouring countries such as Uganda and Rwanda, which support armed groups on Congolese soil, remains a key factor in the perpetual cycle of war in Eastern DRC.
M23 – Rwanda Complicit
The M23 is often seen as an extension of Rwandan influence. Despite Kigali’s denials, many testimonies confirm that Rwandan soldiers actively support this group. Recent reports by experts indicate the presence of around 4,000 Rwandan soldiers in North Kivu, fighting alongside the M23 against the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC).
Meanwhile, it remains unclear how long Kigali will profit from Congolese resources, with export revenues doubling in just two years. The goal is clear: to pressure Kinshasa into negotiating with the M23, thereby legitimizing the de facto annexation of certain mineral-rich areas and integrating its men into public services to maintain influence over both the land and the subsoil of the DRC.
In response to this complex situation, the Congolese government, under Félix Tshisekedi’s leadership, refuses to engage in direct talks with the M23, insisting that an agreement with Kigali is necessary to restore peace. Since the M23 resumed hostilities in 2022, Kinshasa opted for a military approach, allocating a quarter of its national budget to the army. However, despite these efforts, the Congolese armed forces struggle to contain the M23, relying on local militias and mercenaries.
As the mineral wealth of North Kivu remains at the heart of the conflict, economic and security issues intertwine, making the situation much more complex and volatile. The region’s riches, so precious, have thus become the engine of a conflict whose resolution still seems distant.
The involvement of regional African organizations in seeking an African solution, along with modest international pressure, has so far failed to achieve the desired outcome: discouraging the M23 and its known supporters from stopping the fighting and promoting a genuine solution to the crisis. The efforts of Christian religious leaders visiting Goma have yielded no results thus far.
Sixty years after African independence, instead of focusing on development to improve the living standards of local populations, the region is sinking deeper into an intolerable cycle of violence that is disastrous for both the local populations and the continent.